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COMMENTS
Property: Creating a Slayer Statute Oklahomans Can Live
With
L Introduction
"It is almost as important that property law be predictable as that it be
right."' Although not everyone fully agrees with this statement, when the law
is both unpredictable and wrong, change often comes more swiftly. Not so,
however, with Oklahoma's slayer statute.2 A slayer statute is a law that
prevents a murderer, or sometimes less-culpable killer, from taking property
as a beneficiary of his victim through testate or intestate succession.' Not all
jurisdictions have such laws; some states apply common law maxims to
achieve the same result, and a very small number of states have yet to apply
the rule at all.4
Oklahoma passed its slayer statute in 1915,' two years after the Oklahoma
Supreme Court allowed a man who murdered his wife to take half of her estate
under Oklahoma's intestacy scheme.6 The legislature has amended the law
three times since, most recently in 1994.' The result is a hodgepodge of laws
1. Estate of Propst, 788 P.2d 628, 639 (Cal. 1990) (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
2. 84 OKLA. STAT. § 231 (2001).
3. Curiously, the term "slayer statute," although in wide use by commentators, see, e.g.,
Brian W. Underdahl, Creating a New Public Policy in Estate of O'Keefe: Judicial Legislation
Using a Slayer Statute in a Novel Way, 44 S.D. L. REV. 828 (1999), has not found its way into
our dictionaries. The closest entry in Black's Law Dictionary is "slayer's rule," which is
essentially the common law doctrine that a person who kills another person could not in any
way share in the distribution of the slain person's estate. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1393 (7th
ed. 1999). A statute is, of course, "[a] law passed by a legislative body." Id. at 1420. Thus, we
can infer that a "slayer statute" is the formal written enactment of the slayer rule.
4. Five states are without any form of slayer statute: Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri,
New Hampshire, and New York. Three of those states apply the rule by common law:
Maryland, Prince v. Hitaffer, 165 A. 470, 474 (Md. 1933) (applying to testate succession);
Missouri, Perry v. Strawbridge, 108 S.W. 641, 648 (Mo. 1908) (applying to intestate
succession); and New York, Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. App. Div. 1889)
(applying to intestate succession). In the other two states, Massachusetts and New Hampshire,
the courts have never squarely faced the question. See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and
the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CINN. L. REV. 803, 805-06 n.12 (1993).
5. Act Relating to Heirs or Beneficiary Causing Death or Disability, ch. 136, § 1, 1915
Okla. Sess. Laws 185.
6. Holloway v. McCormick, 1913 OK 692, 136 P. 1111.
7. This comment provides, for the convenience of the reader, the full text of the original
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1910 statute, additions and deletions from each of three amendments passed.
1) The full text of the original enactment:
Guilty Party May Not Benefit by Action.
Section 1. No person who is convicted of having taken, or causes or procures
another so to take, the life of another, shall inherit from such person, or receive
any interest in the estate of the decedent, or take by devise or legacy, or descent
or distribution, from him, or her, any portion of his, or her, estate; and no
beneficiary of any policy of insurance or certificate of membership issued by any
benevolent association or organization, payable upon the death or disability of any
person, who in like manner takes or cause or procures to be taken, the life upon
which such policy or certificate is issued, or who causes or procures a disability
of such person, shall take the proceeds of such policy or certificate; but in every
instance mentioned in this section all benefits that would accrue to any such
person upon the death or disability of the person whose life is thus taken, or who
is thus disabled, shall become subject to distribution among the other heirs of such
deceased person according to the laws of descent and distribution, in case of
death, and in case of disability, the benefits thereunder shall be paid to the
disabled person; provided, however, that an insurance company shall be
discharged of all liability under a policy issued by it upon payment of the proceeds
in accordance with the terms thereof, unless before such payment the company
shall have written notice by or in behalf of some claimant other then the
beneficiary named in the policy that a claim to the proceeds of such policy will be
made by heirs of such deceased under the provisions of this Act.
Approved March 13, 1915.
Act Relating to Heirs or Beneficiary Causing Death or Disability, ch. 136, § 1, 1915 Okla. Sess.
Laws. 185.
2) The 1963 amendment:
Amending the title to read, "§ 231. Person causing death not to inherit nor
benefit by insurance of decedent".
Act Relating to Wills and Succession, ch. 309, § 1, 1963 Okla. Sess. Laws 447 (codified as
amended at 84 OKLA. STAT. § 231 (2001)).
Amending first sentence to read, "No person who is convicted of murder or
manslaughter in the first degree under the laws of this State, or the laws of any
other state or Foreign Country, of having taken, caused or procured another so to
take, the life of another ..
Id. (emphasis added).
3) The 1975 amendment:
Amending first sentence to read, "No person who is convicted of murder in the
first degree, as defined in 21 0.S.1971, Section 701.1, or murder in the second
degree, as defined in 21 O.S.1971 701.2, subparagraph I or 2, or manslaughter
in the first degree, as defined in 21 O.S. 1971, Section 711, subparagraph 2, under
the laws of this state... shall ... take.. as a surviving joint tenant .... "
Act Relating to Wills and Succession, ch. 356, § 1, 1975 Okla. Sess. Laws 672 (codified as
amended at 84 OKLA. STAT. § 231 (2001)).
4) The 1994 amendment:




that are ambiguous, too narrow in some instances, too broad in others, and at
times contradictory. Such a state of affairs has forced the Oklahoma Supreme
Court to employ, at best, creative methods to circumvent the statute's
absurdities and, at worst, to ignore the statute completely. Ultimately, this has
created a "system" of law and court-made rules that is difficult to
understand - i.e., unpredictable - and based on poor policy choices - i.e.,
wrong. Although the current framework is probably better than no legislation
at all, it is time that Oklahoma lawmakers consider enacting a new slayer
statute.
This comment's primary purpose is to aid legislators in defining problems
inherent in the current law and to suggest possible changes. To the extent that
such changes do not materialize, this comment works to aid practitioners who
are attempting to wade through Oklahoma's slayer laws in applying the
current law to their own factual situations.
To that end, Part Id presents the historical background of the common law
slayer rule, from feudal England to Oklahoma's enactment of its statutory
version. In an attempt to discern the current state of the law concerning
slayers in Oklahoma, Part mH examines Oklahoma's original slayer Act, its
various amendments, and various cases interpreting its language. Part IV
suggests answers to the difficult policy choices that lawmakers face when
drafting a comprehensive slayer statute and examines how other jurisdictions
have approached the issue. Part V explores and recommends the adoption of
the Uniform Probate Code's (UPC) model slayer statute.
II. Of Killers and Kings: A Historical Overview
The problem of what to do with a slayer and his bounty is, of course, not
new.8 The history of homicide is not brief, and a killer's motivation is often
greed. The law has rarely been complacent, however, in allowing the slayer
to collect on his crime. This section briefly reviews the legal devices that
courts and legislatures have used to prevent a slayer from economically
benefiting from his wrong.
The early English system had no need for legislation on the matter because
it used the traditional doctrines of attainder, corruption and forfeiture of blood,
and the 1975 additions of the specific location of each numerated offense. It also added POD
and TOD accounts as items from which a slayer may not benefit. Act Relating to Designations
of Beneficiaries, ch. 313, § 9, 1994 Okla. Sess. Laws 1406 (codified at 84 OKLA. STAT. § 231
(2001)).
8. See generally Alison Reppy, The Slayer's Bounty - History of Problem in Anglo-
American Law, 19 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 229 (1942) (furnishing a concise history of the historical
problems and solutions concerning a killer benefiting economically from his victim).
2004]
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and escheat to keep the slayer from his bounty.9 The ancient doctrine of
attainder "was a state in which a person was placed, by operation of law, upon
sentence for a capital offense, such as treason or some other felony."'
Unfortunately for the attainted person's family, the doctrine brought with it
some negative consequences for third parties, known as incidents of
attainder." The incident of forfeiture of chattels insisted that the attainted
felon, immediately upon conviction, forfeit his personal property to the king. 2
The incident of forfeiture of estate demanded that the attainted felon forfeit
all his land "during the life of the offender, on the pronouncement of
sentence." 13 Corruption of blood, another incident of attainder, provided that
the attainted felon "could not convey his estate to his heirs, nor could they
take by descent from him.... [T]he felon's heirs unto the remotest generation
were barred from inheritance." 4
Parliament began abolishing these archaic doctrines in 1814 and completed
the task fifty-six years later with the Forfeiture Act of 1870. '" That Act forced
English courts to make a decision: either seek innovative remedies or allow
slayers to recover.'6  Choosing the former, courts "discovered and
promulgated the 'so-called rule of public policy,' which forbade a criminal
from profiting from his own wrong." 17
The ancient doctrines did become a part of American colonial law;
however, "[fior the most part, [the states] have been saved from this
complication by constitutional and statutory abolishment of the[]
undemocratic and archaic features of the common law."' 8 Oklahoma is no
exception in this regard, as it abolished the incidents of corruption of blood
and forfeiture of estate in its constitution.' 9 Oklahoma, along with the rest of
the country, was then forced to create a way, if it so desired, to keep killers
from benefiting from their wrongs.
The first American case of import concerning a slayer's bounty was New
York Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Annstrong, ° in which a man took out a life
9. Id. at 230.
10. Id. at 231.
11. See id.
12. Id. at 232-33.
13. Id. at 233.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 234-38.
16. See id. at 24 1.
17. Id. at 242 (quoting Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund L. Ass'n, 1 Q.B. 147 (C.A. 1892)).
18. Id. at 244.
19. OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 15.




insurance policy on his own life, payable to himself or his assigns.2' The man
then assigned the policy to a third party, who was later convicted of killing the
man.22 When the insurance company refused to pay the proceeds to the
administrator of the man's estate, the administrator sued. 3 Upon losing, the
administrator appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 4 Justice Field declared for
the Court:
[I]ndependently of any proof of the motives of [the slayer] in
obtaining the policy, and even assuming that they were just and
proper, [the slayer] forfeited all rights under it when, to secure its
immediate payment, he murdered the assured. It would be a
reproach to the jurisprudence of the country, if one could recover
insurance money payable on the death of a party whose life he had
feloniously taken.25
Three years after Armstrong, the New York Court of Appeals decided
Riggs v. Palmer.E6 The case quickly became a bastion for the slayer rule in
America, especially as it relates to noninsurance cases.27 In that case a
grandson, who was a beneficiary under his grandfather's will, killed his
grandfather. 8 The court addressed whether the state Statute of Wills
permitted the grandson to take under his grandfather's will.29 Although a
majority of the court refused to allow the grandson to take, the dissent
vigorously argued that the grandson should take under a strict reading of the
state statute.30 That is, the grandfather had complied with the execution
formalities of the Statute of Wills, and the grandson was not within any of the
legislatively created exceptions as to who could be a beneficiary. 3' Therefore,
the argument went, the legislature must have intended for the murderer to take
under the will.32 The dissent insisted that it was the job of the legislature, not
21. Id. at 592-93.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. The defendant-insurance company removed the case to the federal courts as a
diversity case. ld.
25. Id. at 600.
26. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
27. See Daniel A. Farber, Courts, Statutes, and Public Policy: The Case of the Murderous
Heir, 53 S.M.U. L. REV. 31 (2000).
28. Riggs, 22 N.E. at 189.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 191-93 (Gray, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 189.
32. Id.
2004]
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the courts, to modify the existing rule.33 Nevertheless, the famous majority
opinion by Judge Earl relied on the public policy rule that a wrongdoer should
not benefit from his wrong, a rule first constructed by common law English
courts after Parliament had abolished the incidents to attainder.34 Judge Earl
insisted that the statute must be read with that maxim in mind because the
legislature must have had it in mind as well.3 Therefore, the court held that
the grandson was barred from taking under the will.36
Although Riggs and Armstrong deal with dramatically different areas of the
law - Riggs with the traditionally legislative field of wills and Armstrong
with the traditionally judicial field of contracts - together they pose a
fundamental jurisprudential question: What is the extent of the courts'
rulemaking authority? Should courts be relegated to the role of robotic
interpreters, capable of adding nothing of substance to the law, as the Riggs
dissent might maintain? Or do courts serve some greater role?
It is surprising that the questions addressed in Riggs and Armstrong took so
long to surface in America. Whether this was a result of the lengthened time
between a death sentence and the execution of that sentence, because the
young nation had other concerns, or for other reasons, is not fully evident. In
any event, Riggs triggered the question of what to do with a slayer and his
bounty, regardless of whether that bounty came by will, statute, or contract.
In the myriad of slayer cases that followed Riggs, only a few jurisdictions
followed New York's lead.37
III. The State of Oklahoma Law Concerning Slayers
A. The Law Before Legislation: Simpler Times
The Riggs question arose in Oklahoma less than five months after
statehood,38 and involved a homicide in Indian country.39 In De Graffenreid
v. Iowa Land & Trust Co., a husband murdered his wife and then attempted
to collect from her estate under the Creek laws of descent and distribution.n
33. Id. at 191-92 (Gray, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 190.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 191.
37. New York is one of only five states with no slayer statute. See supra note 4.
38. Oklahoma gained statehood November 16, 1907. COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 45 (Paul
Lagasse ed., 6th ed. 2000). It was the 46th state to enter the union. Id. The first case regarding
the slayer rule was decided April 13, 1908. De Graffenreid v. Iowa Land & Trust Co., 1908 OK
49, 95 P. 624.
39. De Graffenreid, 77, 95 P. at 640.




Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court interpreted Creek law in De
Graffenreid, and the case ultimately turned on complicated issues of
jurisdiction in Indian country,4 the court stated a general rule:
'By the weight of authority, in the absence of express provisions
excluding from inheritance an heir murdering the intestate, the
operation of the statute of descent is not affected by the fact that
the ancestor was murdered by the heir apparent in order to obtain
the inheritance at once, and therefore an heir who murders his
ancestor in order that he may inherit the estate at once is not
disqualified from taking .... 42
Although the De Graffenreid court stated the rule as applying to inheriting
descendants only, given that the holding of the case pertained to spouses,43 the
rule clearly applied to inheritances in general, and likely to bequests and
devises as well. Indeed, the next Oklahoma case concerning a slayer and his
bounty, Holloway v. McCormick, 4 relied on De Graffenreid for that general
holding.45
The facts of Holloway are similar to those of De Graffenreid, except for the
absence of Indian country jurisdictional issues. In Holloway, a husband killed
his wife and then himself.4 6 The wife died intestate with two possible
heirs - her husband and her brother.47 The husband also died intestate with
two possible heirs - his father and his son from a prior relationship.48
Initially, the probate court found that when the wife died, her estate passed in
equal parts to the husband and her brother.49 When the husband died, his
estate, which now included half of the wife's estate, went solely to his father
because the probate court was never aware of the existence of the father's
nonmarital son.5" The father brought a partition action against the wife's
brother.5 The wife's brother counterclaimed, contending that he should have
taken the whole estate, and inviting the court to adopt a common law slayer




45. Id. 6, 136 P. at 1113 (quoting De Graffenreid, 77, 95 P. at 640).
46. Id. l, 136 P. at 1112.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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rule as in Riggs.52 The trial court declined the invitation and held that upon
the wife's death, half of the wife's estate passed to the husband-slayer.53
The relevant issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred by not
applying a common law slayer rule.5 4 Although it found the argument
"ingenious," the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that there was no room for the
court to intrude into the legislatively controlled area of intestacy.55 Despite
the fact that the court cited neither Armstrong nor Riggs, it did note that none
of the insurance or will cases were "exactly in point with the case at bar."56
The Holloway court noted several reasons for its holding. First, the court
was clearly aware of the spirit versus the letter-of-the-law conundrum the
slayer question poses. 57 Determined to follow the letter of the law, the court
stated that the equitable arguments favoring the spirit approach "'would have
great weight if there were ambiguity in the statute, or if it were the province
of the court to settle the policy of the state with respect to the descent of
property."'5 8 The court also worried about stepping on legislative toes by
determining for itself "'the character and extent of punishment which should
be inflicted for the commission of crime."' 59 Second, the court reasoned that
adopting a slayer rule would violate the Oklahoma constitutional provision
forbidding the use of the feudal doctrines of forfeiture of estate and corruption
of blood.60  Finally, the court felt compelled to follow the precedent
established by De Graffenreid.6'
52. Id.
53. Id. Even though the trial court essentially affirmed what happened at the probate level,
it did significantly alter the holdings of the litigants. Because the husband's nonmarital son was
added as an indispensable party, the son, in lieu of the father, took the husband's whole estate
(which included half of the wife's estate). Id. 2, 136 P. at 1112. It is for this reason that the
father appealed as well, claiming that the method by which the husband recognized the son was
legally insufficient. Id. 9, 136 P. at 1114. The supreme court agreed and declared that the
writing was insufficient as a matter of law and remanded the case to the district court to reinstate
the father's inheritance potion. Id. 1 14, 136 P. at 1115.
54. Seeid. [2, 136P. at 1112.
55. Id. 2,136P.atlll3.
56. Id. 2,136P.atlll2.
57. Seeid. 4-5, 136P.at 1113.
58. Id. 5, 136 P. at 1113 (quoting McAllister v. Fair, 84 P. 112, 113 (Kan. 1906))
(emphasis added).






Although the Oklahoma legislature passed a slayer statute in 1915,62 two
years after Holloway, the legislature did not make the law retroactive;
therefore, the court ignored the statute in Equitable Life Insurance Co. of
America v. Weightman,63 its next case concerning a slayer and his bounty. In
Weightman, a wife and husband each owned a joint life insurance policy.'
The wife assigned her rights under the policy to a third party assignee, who
later killed the husband.65 The assignee sued the insurance company, claiming
that the insurance company must honor the policy - again inviting the court
to adopt the common law slayer rule, but this time regarding insurance
benefits.66 The husband's estate intervened as a defendant, claiming that
although the slayer rule should bar the assignee from taking under the policy,
the insurance company should pay the proceeds into the estate of the
husband.67
Citing Armstrong, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Oklahoma would
follow the common law slayer rule as to insurance cases, despite the lack of
legislative guidance. 68 This fact, coupled with the rule that forbids an assignee
from taking more rights than the assignor, effectively barred the assignee from
taking under the policy. 69 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the
common law rule that one should not benefit from a criminal act.7" However,
the court held that the liability of the insurance company should not come to
an end simply because it was impossible to pay the technical beneficiary of
the contract.7' Rather, the court held that the husband - who was wholly
faultless in his own death - should not lose the benefit of his bargain
regarding the contract.72 Indeed, the court declared that neither "the law of
contracts, public policy, [nior equity" required such a holding.73 Therefore,
the court ordered the insurance company to pay the proceeds of the policy to
the husband's estate and not to the slayer.74
62. Act Relating to Heirs or Beneficiary Causing Death or Disability, ch. 136, § 1, 1915
Okla. Sess. Laws 185.
63. 1916 OK 879, 160 P. 629.
64. Id. 2, 160 P. at630.
65. Id. 6, 160 P. at 630.
66. See id. 1, 160 P. at 629-30.
67. Id. 11, 160 P. at 630.
68. Id. 15, 160 P. at 631-32.
69. Id. 1 18, 160 P. at 632.
70. Id. [14, 160P. at631.
71. Id. 126, 160 P. at 633.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. 36, 160 P. at 635.
2004]
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B. The Legislature Intervenes
Perhaps recognizing the disparity of results between contract, inheritance,
and insurance cases, or perhaps just finally getting around to it, the Oklahoma
legislature passed a slayer statute in 1915."5 Since then, the statute has
undergone three amendments and various court interpretations.76
This section attempts to clarify how current Oklahoma law deals with a
slayer and his bounty. Although the legislature has never sectionalized the
statute, it can be broken into four parts for convenience. The first defines
"slayer" for purposes of the statute. The second identifies what a slayer
forfeits once a court determines his status. The third determines who takes the
bounty in lieu of the slayer. The fourth provides protection for insurance
companies who hold policies with slayers as beneficiaries. The following
sections: (1) provide the full text of the portion of the statute examined; (2)
comment upon any ambiguities that require interpretation; and (3) examine
Oklahoma cases that address the ambiguities.
1. Who Is a Slayer?
a) The Text
The current portions of Oklahoma's slayer statute that define "slayer" are
found in two different places within the statute. The first clause of the statute
defines "slayer" for death-time property transfers.77 Later, the statute defines
the term for the purposes of insurance. 78 Thus, Oklahoma law currently
defines a "slayer" as any
person who is convicted of murder in the first degree, murder in
the second degree, or manslaughter in the first degree, as defined
by the laws of this state, or the laws of any other state or foreign
country, of having taken, caused, or procured another to take, the
life of an individual ... and [any] beneficiary of any policy of
insurance or certificate of membership issued by any benevolent
75. Act Relating to Heirs or Beneficiary Causing Death or Disability, ch. 136, § 1, 1915
Okla. Sess. Laws 185.
76. Act Relating to Wills and Succession, ch. 309, § 1, 1963 Okla. Sess. Laws 447
(codified as amended at 84 OKLA. STAT. § 231 (2001)); Act Relating to Wills and Succession,
ch. 356, § 1, 1975 Okla. Sess. Laws 672 (codified as amended at 84 OKLA. STAT. § 231 (2001));
Act Relating to Designations of Beneficiaries, ch. 313, § 9, 1994 Okla. Sess. Laws 1399
(codified at 84 OKLA. STAT. § 231 (2001)); see supra note 7.





association or organization, payable upon the death or disability of
any person, who in like manner takes, causes, or procures to be
taken, the life upon which such policy or certificate is issued, or
who causes or procures a disability of such person .... 79
The law as originally written and as subsequently amended suffers from
several ambiguities that make it inefficient and difficult to apply.
b) Ambiguities
One of the most important questions confronting a legislature when writing
a slayer statute is how to define "slayer." Although that question might seem
elementary, it is a profound task that invokes important jurisprudential
questions about the nature and security of property rights. Questions such as
what proof should be required and what presumptions should be made involve
difficult policy choices. Oklahoma's law leaves many of these questions
unanswered.
Ostensibly, when crafting the original statute, the Oklahoma legislature
intended to require a criminal conviction to confer slayer status. Although
legislative history is completely lacking,8" both the title and language of the
79. Id. The italicized language was added by a 1994 amendment. § 9, 1994 Okla. Sess.
Laws 1399.
80. Oklahoma, then and now, has no official system for determining substantive legislative
history. Procedural histories are available for both the House and the Senate through the House
and Senate reports, though these generally give no information as to legislative intent.
Whether or not legislative history is useful in statutory interpretation has been, and continues
to be, a topic of great debate. One commentator has summarized the debate well:
Many commentators take the view that legislative intent has no proper role in
statutory construction. For them, legislative intent is indeterminate, and, therefore,
useless at best, and possibly even mischievous. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 17 (Textualists "do not really look for subjective
legislative intent."); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in
Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 59, 62 (1988) (The use of
legislative intent as a tool of statutory construction "increases the discretion, and
therefore the power, of the court."); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43
HARv. L. REV. 863, 872 (1930) ("A legislative intent, undiscoverable in fact,
irrelevant if it were discovered, is the last residuum of our 'golden rule.' It is a
queerly amorphous piece of slag. Are we really reduced to such shifts that we
must fashion monsters and endow them with imaginations in order to understand
statutes?"). According to the traditional view, legislative intent is a meaningful
tool of statutory construction. See, e.g., Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries
of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History in Statutory Interpretation, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 901, 952 (2000) ("The legislative history at least may alert the
interpreter to the possible complexities of the language used in the statute.");
Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L.
2004]
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statute seem to suggest the legislative intent. The statute's subtitle originally
read, "Guilty Party May Not Benefit By Action."'" Further, although the
legislature used the broad language "taken, or causes or procures another so
to take, the life of another" to define the necessary acts, it insisted that a court
convict the slayer of those acts.82 However, although in modem parlance
lawmakers generally reserve the words "guilty parties" and "convicted" for
the criminal context, those words were formally used to describe a wrongdoer
in general.83 For these reasons, it is unclear whether the 1915 Oklahoma
legislature intended a criminal conviction as necessary to label a person a
slayer within the meaning of the statute - at least as far as death-time testate
and intestate transfers were concerned. It is even more difficult to decipher
the intent of the Oklahoma legislature when defining "slayer" for purposes of
insurance transfers. The legislature used the same "taken, or causes or
procures another so to take" language, even adding "in like manner" -
suggesting that the tests were the same for insurance as for other property
transfers.84
Subsequent amendments to this portion of the statute fail to illuminate
whether the legislature intended a criminal conviction to be sufficient to
assign slayer status. Although simple logic might suggest that the legislature,
by inserting the names of specific crimes, was attempting to make the
conviction requirement clearer, the amendment itself does not necessarily
REV. 1, 32-33 (1985) (Separation of powers under the Constitution requires that
statutes be construed in light of legislative intent); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling
Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89
Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 280-81 (1990)
("Although early American courts used legislative history somewhat sparingly, the
increasingly liberal use of these extra-textual materials in determining what a law
means can be traced back at least a century.").
David F. Shores, Antitrust Decisions and Legislative Intent, 66 Mo. L. REV. 725, 727-28 n.9
(2001).
For a general discussion of what state legislative history materials are available and where
to find them, see generally MORRIS L. COHEN ET AL., HOW TO FIND THE LAW 257-60 (9th ed.
1989).
81. Act Relating to Heirs or Beneficiary Causing Death or Disability, ch. 136, § 1, 1915
Okla. Sess. Laws 185 (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. The 1910 edition of Black's Law Dictionary defines "guilty" as "[h]aving committed
a crime or tort." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 863 (3d ed. 1910). Although that same edition
defines "conviction" as "the result of a criminal trial which ends in a judgment or sentence that
the prisoner is guilty as charged," it goes on to note that "in legal parlance, [the word
conviction] often denotes the final judgment of the court." Id. at 432. Presumably, "the court,"
in that case, could be either a criminal or a civil court.




reveal its cause. Indeed, the opposite argument - that the amending
legislature was attempting to impose a conviction requirement that the original
drafters omitted - seems just as plausible.
In any event, determining whether the statute requires a criminal conviction
is only the beginning of this definitional dilemma. If the language requires a
criminal conviction, the question remains whether that conviction is sufficient
to confer slayer status. Such a holding may implicate due process concerns
and raise issues of offensive collateral estoppel, which effective legislation
should address. On the other hand, if a criminal conviction is not required, the
daunting task of determining exactly what is sufficient remains. The statute
does not address these issues, and Oklahoma courts have adjudicated but a
few.
Another problem posed by this definitional portion of the Oklahoma slayer
statute is the effect of a conviction, or other adjudication, if deemed adequate,
in a foreign jurisdiction. The original statute did not address this question;
however, as amended, the answer seems clear - the statute allows a
conviction for one of the three listed crimes in other jurisdictions to create
slayer status.85 However, the issues of jurisdiction and conviction, when
combined, may result in questions that neither amendments nor case law have
resolved. For example, what is the result when the laws of another state or
foreign jurisdiction define the itemized crimes in a different fashion than
Oklahoma's criminal code?
c) Case Law
The first case requiring judicial interpretation of the slayer statute,
Harrison v. Moncravie,86 asked whether the statute required that the killing
take place in Oklahoma. In Harrison, a wife killed her husband in Kansas.87
The wife-slayer sued the couple's daughter in an Oklahoma federal court
seeking half of the Oklahoma real estate in the husband-victim's estate.88 The
circuit court agreed with the trial court that the statute's penal nature required
strict construction.89 The circuit court determined that because terms of the
statute did not, on their face, apply to such a situation, the wife must take
despite her Kansas conviction.9°
85. 84 OKLA. STAT. § 231 (2001); see supra note 7.
86. 264 F. 776 (8th Cir. 1920).
87. Id. at 778.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 784.
90. Id. at 784-85.
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This result is surprising given that, at that time, section 231 enumerated no
Oklahoma crimes, but required only a "conviction." 9' However, if the
Harrison court's interpretation concerned the Oklahoma legislature, it failed
to express its concern, at least for forty-three years. It was not until 1963 that
the legislature amended the statute to include anyone convicted "under... the
laws of any other state or Foreign Country."92
In 1985, the Oklahoma Supreme Court revisited the issue of whether the
statute required a criminal conviction. In State Mutual Life Assurance Co. v.
Hampton,93 a wife was charged with killing her husband.94 The insurance
company, holding a policy on the life of the husband with the wife as the
primary beneficiary, initiated an interpleader action to determine to whom, if
anyone, it should pay the proceeds of the policy. 95 When the trial court found
the wife not guilty by reason of insanity, she filed a motion for summary
judgment in the interpleader action.96 The trial court denied the motion, and
the wife appealed.97 The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in affirming the ruling of
the trial court, held that (1) a conviction is not a necessary prerequisite for the
invocation of the slayer statute,98 and (2) an acquittal is not a bar to invoking
the statute.99
Regarding its first holding, the court reasoned that the statutory language
that applied to insurance cases, unlike that for inheritance cases, did not
require any specific crime.' 00 Rather, that part of the statute required only that
a person take, cause, or procure another to take the policyholder's life to
invoke the statute.' 01 Because one can take, cause, or procure to take
another's life without a criminal conviction, the court reasoned that a
conviction was not a necessary element under the statute. 10 2 The court also
distinguished earlier insurance cases involving convictions, saying that "the
91. Act Relating to Heirs or Beneficiary Causing Death or Disability, ch. 136, § 1, 1915
Okla. Sess. Laws 185.
92. Act Relating to Wills and Succession, ch. 309, § 1, 1963 Okla. Sess. Laws 447
(codified as amended at 84 OKLA. STAT. § 231 (2001)).
93. 1985 OK 19, 696 P.2d 1027.
94. Id. 5, 696 P.2d at 1029.
95. Id. 6, 696 P.2d at 1030.
96. Id. 7, 696 P.2d at 1030.
97. Id.
98. Id. 1 23, 696 P.2d at 1032.
99. Id. 1 30, 696 P.2d at 1033.
100. Id. 16, 696 P.2d at 1031.
101. See id. 1 10, 696 P.2d at 1030.
102. Id. 21, 696 P.2d at 1032 ("Section 231 does not provide that a conviction of the
statutorily designated degrees of homicide is the only ground for a beneficiary's disqualification,




holdings in these cases indicate that it was the beneficiary's felonious act
rather than the fact of the beneficiary's conviction that this Court found to be
determinative."' 3 The Hampton court also relied on similar statutes of other
states and judicial readings that had removed the requirement of a
conviction.4 Ultimately, the court concluded that "automatic disqualification
of a convicted beneficiary is merely an extension of the common law rule that
no person should benefit from his own wrongful conduct, and not a limitation
or abrogation of that rule."'0 5
As for its second holding, the Hampton court held that "in light of the
disparate consequences of a criminal adjudication and a civil proceeding, we
find it unlikely that the legislature intended that an acquittal have any effect
on the question of a beneficiary's right to insurance proceeds under [section]
231. , ,06 Indeed, an acquittal, based solely on the state's inability to prove a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, will not normally bar a litigant from proving
a crime in a civil action by a preponderance of the evidence.0 7 The court
found no reason to modify this general rule for slayer cases.'0 8 Further, the
court reasoned that because neither the estate nor the other children -- "who
[would be] entitled to take under [section] 231 if [the] wife is barred" - were
allowed to participate in the criminal prosecution, it would violate due process
standards to allow their rights to be adjudicated in that action.'0 9
Hampton proposed several equitable solutions to difficult slayer
problems - solutions with which most people would probably agree. There
is no doubt, however, that Hampton represented a shift in the way the
Oklahoma Supreme Court evaluated the slayer problem - a shift from
deciding cases based on the letter of the law to deciding cases based on the
spirit of the law.
103. Id. 1 15, 696 P.2d at 1031 (emphasis added).
104. Id. 17, 696 P.2d at 1031. The court cites the Kansas, North Carolina, Ohio, South
Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, and Utah statutes, along with corresponding cases from each
jurisdiction. Id. 1 15 nn.3-4, 696 P.2d at 1031 nn.3-4.
105. Id. 17, 696 P.2d at 1031.
106. Id. 9127,696 P.2d at 1033.
107. Price v. Reed, 1986 OK 43, 7,725 P.2d 1254, 1257-58 ("[A]n acquittal is never a bar
to a civil action that arises out of the same facts as those which formed the basis of the criminal
offense. No acquittal proves that the defendant is innocent; it merely reflects that there was a
reasonable doubt in the jury's mind as to his guilt.") (footnote omitted).
108. See Hampton, N 24-30, 696 P.2d at 1032-33.
109. Id. 9129,696 P.2d at 1033 (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,326 n.7
(1979), and Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S.
313, 329 (1971), for examples of possible due process problems).
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Justice Doolin's dissent in Hampton highlights this shift. Justice Doolin
insists that the majority opinion "ignores the plain language of this statute in
deference to decisions rendered by this Court in 1916 [Weightman] and 1935
[Goodwin]; the former having been issued prior to the effective date of the
statute and the latter prior to two, important amendments."' l 0  The
amendments to which Justice Doolin referred inserted more exacting
definitions of the statutory crimes required to invoke the statute."' The
legislature added the specific crimes of murder in the first degree, murder in
the second degree, and manslaughter in the first degree to the definitional
portion of the statute." 2 Justice Doolin ascribed to these additions an intent
to modify the term "conviction" within the meaning of the statute." 3 He
stated, "It is unsound reasoning to suppose the Legislature would twice make
additions which more precisely define the term 'conviction,' without some
intent to alter its traditional meaning.""' 4 Justice Doolin was unwilling to
"conclude the Legislature has done a vain thing" in enacting the
amendments.' Indeed, a narrowing of the definition of "conviction" within
the meaning of the statute was the only purpose he could divine for the
amendments." 6 That definition, Justice Doolin concluded, which originally
required a conviction of a general sort, now required a conviction of one of the
three specific crimes mentioned." 7
Hampton's equitable reading of the slayer statute, which virtually ignored
the plain language of that Act, was not too surprising given that Hampton was
an insurance case. However, the case of In re Estates of Young,'" which
extends the reasoning of Hampton to inheritance cases, is more surprising. In
Young, a son killed both his parents, but the trial court found the son not guilty
110. Id. 2, 696 P.2d at 1037 (Doolin, J. dissenting).
111. Act Relating to Wills and Succession, ch. 309, § 1, 1963 Okla. Sess. Laws 447
(codified as amended at 84 OKLA. STAT. § 231 (2001)); Act Relating to Wills and Succession,
ch. 356, § 1, 1975 Okla. Sess. Laws 672 (codified as amended at 84 OKLA. STAT. § 231 (2001));
see supra note 7.
112. § 1, 1963 Okla. Sess. Laws 447. A later legislature added the specific section numbers
where those three crimes in Oklahoma could be found. § 1, 1975 Okla. Sess. Laws 672. A later
amendment, after Hampton, took the section numbers back out, thus reverting to the 1963
language. Act Relating to Designations of Beneficiaries, ch. 313, § 9, 1994 Okla. Sess. Laws
1399 (codified at 84 OKLA. STAT. § 231 (2001)); see supra note 7.
113. Hampton, 4, 696 P.2d at 1037 (Doolin, J., dissenting).
114. Id. (Doolin, J., dissenting).
115. Id. 5, 696 P.2d at 1037 (Doolin, J., dissenting).
116. Id. 6, 696 P.2d at 1037 (Doolin, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Doolin, J., dissenting).




by reason of insanity." 9 The son's siblings sued to keep him from taking
either the life insurance proceeds or taking as an heir to their parents'
estates.120 The son filed, and the trial court granted, a motion for summary
judgment regarding the slayer question.' 2' The siblings appealed, arguing, as
in Hampton, that the civil court should allow them to relitigate the slayer
question despite the language of the statute.
22
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, in a memorandum opinion, reversed
the ruling of the trial judge, saying, "By virtue of Section 231, [the rule of
Hampton] is equally applicable to cases involving a decedent's estate and is
not limited only to questions regarding a slayer's right to the decedent's life
insurance proceeds."'23 The court, however, did not offer any substantial
reasoning as to why it thought the reasoning of Hampton applied to
inheritance cases as well as insurance cases.
Because Young was a memorandum opinion by the court of civil appeals,
whether the slayer statute requires a criminal conviction in inheritance cases
remains open. Although there is room for the Oklahoma Supreme Court to
disagree with the court of appeals' extension of Hampton, that avenue appears
unlikely given the supreme court's recent trend towards invoking the spirit,
rather than the letter, of the slayer statute in solving these difficult cases.'24
2. What Is Forfeited?
a) The Text
After determining who qualifies as a slayer, a statute should clearly
delineate what rights a slayer loses. Oklahoma's statute includes the
following items:
No [slayer] shall inherit from the victim, or receive any interest in
the estate of the victim, or take by devise or legacy, or as a
designated beneficiary of an account or security which is a POD
or TOD designation, or as a surviving joint tenant, or by descent
or distribution, from the victim, any portion of the victim's





124. See, e.g., Hampton, discussed supra notes 93-109 and accompanying text; Duncan v.
Vassaur, 1976 OK 65, 550 P.2d 929, discussed infra notes 127-38 and accompanying text.
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estate... [or] take the proceeds of [a life or disability insurance]
policy .. . .25
b) Ambiguities
Oklahoma law has always been broad enough to include testate succession,
life and disability insurance proceeds, and intestate succession; however,
ambiguities arise because the legislature failed to note whether that list was
exhaustive. 126 The legislature amended the statute to include joint tenancies
and POD and TOD accounts, but, as it stands, certain interests remain in
question. Currently, the list does not cover vested remainder interests in a life
tenancy, pension accounts, or other will substitutes. Oklahoma case law has
answered some, but not all, of these questions.
c) Case Law
In 1976, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided Duncan v. Vassaur.2 7 In
that case, a wife killed her husband. '28 While charges were pending, but prior
to conviction, the wife transferred real property previously owned by the
couple as joint tenants with rights of survivorship to her father.129 The father
then filed suit against the husband's estate to quiet title to the property. 3 ° The
husband's estate counterclaimed, asserting title to the real property in
question.' 3 ' The father demurred as to the counterclaims, and the trial court
dismissed them as a matter of law.'32 The husband's estate appealed. 133 The
issue was whether either law or equity prevented a slayer's right of
survivorship from ripening into a present interest because the slayer's
felonious killing of the other tenant accelerated the ripening.'
The Duncan case nicely highlights the tension between the courts and the
legislature that permeates the slayer issue. At the time the cause of action
arose in Duncan - the time of the killing - the forfeiture section of the
125. 84 OKLA. STAT. § 231 (2001). The italicized language was added by 1994 amendment.
Act Relating to Designations of Beneficiaries, ch. 313, § 9, 1994 Okla. Sess. Laws 1399.
126. See Act Relating to Heirs or Beneficiary Causing Death or Disability, ch. 136, § 1, 1915
Okla. Sess. Laws 185.
127. 1976 OK 65, 550 P.2d 929.
128. Id. 1, 550 P.2d at 930.
129. Id. 2, 550 P.2d at 930.








slayer statute did not mention rights of survivorship.'35 The Oklahoma
legislature added the language by emergency amendment and stripped the
right of survivorship from the slayer, even though the amendment became
effective almost a year before the supreme court decided the 
case. 3 6
However, because the court did not apply the statute retroactively,' 37 if it was
to find against the slayer, the court would have to invoke its equitable powers.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court had little trouble once again conjuring up
those powers. It held that the act of killing a co-tenant was "inconsistent with
the continued existence of the joint tenancy and that at the time the murder
was committed, the joint tenancy was terminated and separated."'
38 This
meant that by the act of killing, the wife lost her right of survivorship, but kept
a one-half interest, which transformed into a tenancy in common. Thus,
equity saved the day for this case, but legislation would save it in the future.
Duncan is the only Oklahoma case to interpret the forfeiture portion of the
slayer statute. Although the legislature has made other amendments, there are
no cases on point. Because there are several items not covered and because
the drafting has been less than desirable, the forfeiture portion of the slayer
statute is in dire need of amendment. Also, the section fails to address
possible federal preemption issues under ERISA and pension accounts. A
discussion of what policy choices should control the amendment is found in
Part IV below.
3. If Not the Slayer, Then Who?
a) The Text
After a lawmaker determines that a person is not entitled to property
because he is a slayer, the lawmaker must decide who will receive the slayer's
forfeited property. The Oklahoma legislature attempted to decide that issue
in 1915. The legislature has never amended this portion of the slayer statute:
[I]n every instance mentioned in this section all benefits that would
accrue to any such person upon the death or disability of the person
whose life is thus taken, or who is thus disabled, shall become
subject to distribution among the other heirs of such deceased
person according to the laws of descent and distribution, in the
135. Act Relating to Wills and Succession, ch. 356, § 1, 1975 Okla. Sess. Laws 672
(codified as amended at 84 OKLA. STAT. § 231 (2001)).
136. Id.
137. Duncan, 12, 550 P.2d at 931 ("In adopting the above theory, we are guided by [the
recent amendment to the slayer statute].").
138. Id. 8,550 P.2d at 930.
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case of death, and in case of disability, the benefits thereunder
shall be paid to the disabled person ....
b) Ambiguities
From its inception, this section of Oklahoma's slayer statute has suffered
from inartful drafting. It states that the benefits that would have gone to the
slayer now go to the victim's "other heirs."' 14' This ignores the fact that the
slayer, by the very definition set forth in the same legislation, might not be an
heir at all, but could be a beneficiary, devisee, legatee, or heir. Even if the
word "heir" is read to include any word from the above list - the only way
this portion of the statute makes sense - several problems remain.
First, should the statute be interpreted literally? If so, the statute could
severely frustrate, and in some cases reverse, the probable intent of the victim.
To the extent property transfer laws rely on the principle of donative freedom,
this interpretation is troublesome. Although it is almost always the case that
a victim would, if given the chance, avoid benefiting his killer, whether by
inheritance under a will, or otherwise, other scenarios are not so simple. For
example, what of the case where a nonrelative beneficiary with minor children
kills his benefactor? There, the law should not be so quick to assume that the
testator did not intend the killer's minor children to benefit. This is especially
true if the victim's "other heirs" were specifically disinherited.
A second problem is discerning exactly what the drafters meant by
"accrue ... upon the death ... of the person whose life is thus taken."' 41
What about, for example, a testamentary trust that might have vested in the
slayer immediately? Did the legislature use "accrue" in the sense of "vest" or
in some other sense? Finally, the language of the statute would leave out
descendants of the victim who are not technically heirs because the slayer is
still alive. Is this what the legislature intended? Although the cases give
guidance on some issues, many remain unresolved.
c) Case Law
In National Home Life Assurance Co. v. Patterson,142 a husband was the
primary beneficiary of two life insurance policies owned by his wife and the
sole beneficiary under her will. '43 Both policies controlled who would receive
139. 84 OKLA. STAT. § 231 (2001).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 1987 OK CIV APP 65, 746 P.2d 696.




the proceeds if the primary beneficiary was unavailable.' The first policy
listed the alternate beneficiaries as the issue of the insured and the insured's
estate, in that order.'45 The second policy listed the alternative beneficiaries
as the owner of the policy (i.e., the living spouse) and the insured's estate, also
in that order. 146 When the husband murdered his wife on Christmas day and
was subsequently convicted of the murder, both insurance companies filed an
interpleader action against all parties involved- the husband-slayer, thejoint
child of the husband and wife, stepchildren on each side, and the wife's
estate. 47 The parties stipulated that section 231 prevented the husband from
taking; however, the question remained: Where should the proceeds 
go?' 48
Under the strict terms of section 231, the proceeds would go to the wife's
"other heirs," i.e., her children only. Under the express terms of the wife's
policy however, the proceeds would go to the alternative insurance
beneficiaries, i.e., in one case to the wife's issue only - the same as under the
statute; but in the other case to the wife's estate, thereby to all the children,
wife's step-child included, by way of the wife's will, which included wife's
step-child as a beneficiary. The trial court, not following either path, held that
the proceeds of both policies should pass to the estate of the wife and be
distributed according to her will.'49
Apparently not very fond of the husband's child, the wife's issue and the
wife's estate both appealed, pleading that both policies should pass according
to their express terms. 5° The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals agreed,
holding,
[W]e have considered [the slayer statute], which we believe does
not apply under the facts of this case, as we believe the clear
provisions of [the wife's] Will take precedence over the "descent
and distribution" language of the slayer statute. The competing
interests of the insurance contracts, [the wife's] Will, and our
slayer statute ... compel [this] construction .... 151
144. Id. 2, 746 P.2d at 697.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. 9H 2-3, 746 P.2d at 697.
148. Id. 4, 746 P.2d at 697.
149. Id. 3, 746 P.2d at 697.
150. See id.
151. Id. 7, 746 P.2d at 698.
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In a case similar to Patterson, United Presidential Life Insurance Co. v.
Moss,"'52 a wife allegedly murdered her husband.1 3 The insurance company
initiated an interpleader action regarding the life insurance policy on the life
of the husband with the wife as the primary beneficiary. 5 4 The trial court
dismissed the insurance company after it placed the policy res into the court
fund.'55 The only possible beneficiaries were the wife-slayer, the son of the
wife and husband, and the mother of the husband-victim. 5 6 The mother
counterclaimed, pleading that as alternative beneficiary under the terms of the
policy, she should take. 57 The son claimed that he should take under a strict
reading of the slayer statute.'58 The express terms of the policy required the
primary beneficiary to predecease the alternative beneficiary in order for the
alternative beneficiary to take the proceeds. 15 Everyone agreed that although
the slayer statute effectively denied the wife from taking, the wife did not
actually predecease the mother, for both were still alive. 1
60
Nevertheless, both the trial court and the court of civil appeals agreed that
the money should be awarded to the mother as alternative beneficiary. 16' The
appellate court separated the child's argument into two propositions. 162 The
child's primary argument was that a facial reading of the statute required that
he take the proceeds. 63 In the alternative, the child argued that because
express requirements of the policy were not fulfilled - that is, the primary
beneficiary predecease the secondary beneficiary - the policy prevented the
mother from taking.'64 Although the court called the propositions "arguable,"
it ultimately found them "unpersuasive" and "misplaced." 165 The court found
two issues dispositive. First, the lower court's outcome troubled the court of
appeals because, by allowing the son to inherit, the slayer indirectly controlled
152. 1992 OK CIV APP 19, 838 P.2d 10l1 (mem.).
153. Id. 1 4, 838 P.2d at 1012. The wife was later convicted of the murder. Id. 5 n.2, 838
P.2d at 1013 n.2.
154. Id. 1 2, 838 P.2d at 1012.
155. Id. 3, 838 P.2d at 1012.
156. Id. 2, 838 P.2d at 1012.
157. Id. 6, 838 P.2d at 1013.
158. Id.
159. Id. 1 5, 838 P.2d at 1013.
160. Id.
161. Id. IN 19-20, 838 P.2d at 1014.
162. Id. 1 7, 838 P.2d at 1013.
163. Id.
164. Id.




the disposition of the victim's property. 66 Second, the court wished to give
effect to the probable intent of the victim - namely, that the proceeds go the
alternative beneficiary. 167 The court, satisfied with neither outcome, found for
the mother and awarded her the proceeds. 1
68
Although it is clear that the court came to what it believed to be the most
equitable decision in both Moss and Patterson, it is equally clear that its
holdings required ignoring the distribution portion of the slayer statute. But
if that portion of the slayer statute does not apply under the facts of Patterson
or Moss, under what facts does it apply? The statute clearly states that the
distribution portion applies "in every instance mentioned in this section."' 6 9
By stipulation, and by the facts, each of these cases involved an "instance
mentioned."
Patterson and Moss are still good - and relatively recent, by slayer statute
standards - law in Oklahoma. However, both seem especially vulnerable to
attack. Even if their equitable solutions find favor with the current Oklahoma
Supreme Court, any change in the balance of the court could change the
outcome in a case on similar facts. For that reason, the Oklahoma legislature
should either codify those cases in a new slayer statute or assert its own
unambiguous will.
A different ambiguity arose under the disposition portion of section 231 in
Hulett v. First National Bank & Trust Co. in Clinton,7° Oklahoma's most
recent slayer case. In Hulert, a son was convicted of murdering his mother. ''
In her will, the mother bequeathed specific personalty to her daughter, other
specific personalty to her son, and the residue of the estate to a testamentary
trust for both children to split when the daughter reached age thirty-five.'72 A
probate court found that the son-slayer was unable to take because of section
231 and thus awarded all personalty and all proceeds from the testamentary
trust to the daughter. 7 3 More than six years later, a previously unknown son
of the slayer, who had not received proper notice of the probate proceedings,
collaterally attacked the probate ruling, claiming that he should have taken the
son-slayer's share through the son-slayer, by right of representation.'74
166. Id. 13, 838 P.2d at 1014.
167. Id. 11, 838 P.2d at 1013.
168. Id. U 19-20, 838 P.2d at 1014.
169. 84 OKLA. STAT. § 231 (2001) (emphasis added).
170. 1998 OK 21, 956 P.2d 879.
171. Id. 4, 956 P.2d at 881.
172. Id. 5, 956 P.2d at 882.
173. Id. 6, 956 P.2d at 882-83.
174. Id. 7, 956 P.2d at 883.
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The trial court granted summary judgment to the daughter, presumably
based upon the letter of the statute. 175 Because the statute dictates that the
slayer's portion goes to the "other heirs,"' 76 and because the son-slayer was
still alive, the grandson was not an "heir" under Oklahoma's intestacy scheme,
and he was unable to take. 177 The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reversed
in an unpublished opinion and the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 78
The Oklahoma Supreme Court first noted that all parties correctly agreed
that the slayer statute barred the slayer-son from taking under the will.
179
However, the court went on to reason that the distribution portion of section
231 did not apply to these facts because "[i]t does not apply where nothing
would accrue to the slayer at the death of his victim, a situation unmistakably
evident here in regard to the testamentary trust."'' 80 That is to say, because the
son-slayer would have gained merely a contingent interest in the testamentary
trust upon the death of his mother, subject to his sister reaching age thirty-five,
nothing "accrued" to the slayer within the meaning of the statute.' 8 '
Therefore, the statute's inapplicability compelled the court to turn elsewhere
for guidance on how to distribute the trust.8 2 The court first turned to a
factually similar contemporaneous Kansas decision, Estate of Van Der
Veen. 83 In that case, according to the Hulett court, the Kansas high court held
that when the legislature was silent on the disposition of a slayer's share and
the issue was "wholly innocent," the best rule was to dispose of the slayer's
share as if the slayer predeceased the victim.'84 On this reasoning, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of civil appeals.'85
Although three justices dissented, either in whole or in part, none offered to
share their reasoning.' 86
175. Id. 11,956 P.2d at 883.
176. See 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213B(2)(a) (2001).
177. Hulett, 8, 956 P.2d at 883.
178. Id. 1 11,956 P.2d at 883.
179. Id. 13, 956 P.2d at 884.
180. Id. 16, 956 P.2d at 884.
181. See id.
182. Id. 19, 956 P.2d at 885.
183. 935 P.2d 1042 (Kan. 1997).
184. Hulett, 21, 956 P.2d at 885.
185. Id. 27, 956 P.2d at 887.




4. Protection for Insurance Companies
a) The Text
The last part of the slayer statute provides protection for insurance
companies that pay the proceeds of policies to slayers in good faith. The
legislature has not amended this portion of the section since its enactment in
1915.187 It ensures that
an insurance company shall be discharged of all liability under a
policy issued by it upon payment of the proceeds in accordance
with the terms thereof, unless before such payment the company
shall have written notice by or in behalf of some claimant other
than the beneficiary named in the policy that a claim to the
proceeds of such policy will be made by heirs of such deceased
under the provisions of this Act.188
b) Ambiguities
Although not directly related to this portion of the statute, insurance
companies have faced problems regarding whether they should consider
felonious, intentional, and unjustifiable homicide as "accidental."' 89
c) Case Law
Three cases occurring after Weightman both bolstered and refined its
holding. The Oklahoma Supreme Court decided the first of the three in 1935.
In Goodwin v. Continental Casualty Co.,' 9° the court held that the term
"accidental death" in an insurance policy included intentional killing.' 9' The
holding meant that those policy holders intentionally or feloniously killed
would not lose the benefit of their bargain, but rather, the insurance companies
must pay their estates or alternative beneficiaries the proceeds of the policy.
Four years later, in National Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Reese, 92 the
court extended the Goodwin holding. 193 Finally, NationalAid Life Association
187. See supra note 7.
188. Act Relating to Heirs or Beneficiary Causing Death or Disability, ch. 136, § 1, 1915
Okla. Sess. Laws 185.
189. See generally 11 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 1 (2001) (annotating the problems and
cases that have arisen regarding this question).
190. 1935 OK 1183, 53 P.2d 241.
191. Id. 1 13, 53 P.2d at 243.
192. 1939 OK 452, 96 P.2d 1058.
193. Id. 14, 96 P.2d at 1061 ("It is generally accepted in this and other jurisdictions that
20041
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2004
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
V. May 194 held that, although the term "accidental" does not prevent an
insurance company from paying the victim's estate, the court could avoid that
result given a contract with appropriately expressive language. 9 5 The court
noted, however, that the legislature was free to change this rule at any time. 96
IV. Policy Problems and Other Jurisdictions' Approaches
This area of the law, being no exception to the law in general, is laden with
difficult policy choices for both legislators and judges. This section discusses
some of the most difficult issues facing lawmakers as they create and interpret
a slayer statute and examines how other jurisdictions have addressed those
problems. After briefly discussing some historical attempts at uniform slayer
statutes throughout the states, this section will explore the problems posed in
drafter slayer legislation and examine how different jurisdictions have
approached the issue.
A. Brief History of Uniform Acts Concerning Slayers and the State of the
Current Law
The problem of the slayer and his bounty, as pointed out in Section HI
above, is not new.' 97 However, the drive to pass legislation concerning the
matter is a relatively new phenomenon. It was only when courts began
allowing killers to take as beneficiaries under a will or intestate scheme that
legislatures addressed the problem - and not always with great success.' 98
Since that time, forty-three states have passed purportedly comprehensive
legislation.' 99 Of the other seven, two have limited legislation,"' and three
the fact that one becomes involved in a difficulty and himself commits acts of violence does not
deprive his own injury of its accidental character . .
194. 1949 OK 129, 207 P.2d 292.
195. Id. 25, 207 P.2d at 297.
196. See id.
197. See supra Part H.
198. See Reppy, supra note 8, at 264 (stating, "[t]hus began a series of legislative efforts...
many of which have been almost ludicrous," in referring to North Carolina's attempt at the first
slayer statute).
199. For a list of the slayer statutes alphabetized by state, see Julie J. Olenn, Comment, 'Til
Death Do Us Part: New York's SlayerRule and In re Estates of Covert, 49 BuFF. L. REV. 1341,
1341 n.3 (2001).
200. These are our neighbors Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-204 (Michie 1987)
(covering dowry and curtesy only), and Texas, TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 41 (D) (Vernon 1980)




allow judicial rule to control the issue.2' This leaves only two states with no
legislation or case law on the matter.20 2
Most legislation concerning slayers, in accord with Oklahoma's own
statute, seeks to answer the three key questions outlined in previous sections.
First, they specify which acts are necessary and sufficient to confer slayer
status and how a potential plaintiff must prove those acts. Second, they list
what rights and property a slayer forfeits by virtue of his status. Third, they
explain how to distribute a slayer's forfeited property. Although there are
other issues that a comprehensive statute should address, these are the main
three.
Professor John W. Wade, in his successful 1936 attempt at a uniform slayer
statute, followed this pattern. 0 3 Professor Wade noted that, at the time, the
majority view among legislatures was that they were unable to change the
default rules of intestacy to disallow inheritance to a slayer.2' Even in states
without statutes, but where the courts had adopted a slayer rule, Wade noted
that legislation was "eminently desirable" to ward off attacks by critics that
the measures were "unwarranted judicial legislation," and to encourage
uniformity in the law.2 5 His article, with accompanying suggested legislation,
became the standard for several state slayer statutes.2 6
Many states, including Oklahoma, passed statutes before Wade's 1936
article.20 7 The most influential uniform legislation has been the UPC drafts of
a uniform slayer statute. A significant number of states have now adopted
either the pre-1990 or 1990 version of that statute.20 8
201. They are: Maryland, Prince v. Hitaffer, 165 A. 470,474 (Md. 1933) (applying to testate
succession); Missouri, Perry v. Strawbridge, 108 S.W. 641, 648 (Mo. 1908) (applying to
intestate succession); and New York, Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. App. Div. 1889)
(applying to intestate succession).
202. The question has never been squarely faced in either Massachusetts or New Hampshire.
See Sherman, supra note 4, at 805-06 n.12.
203. John W. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another - A Statutory
Solution, 49 HARv. L. REV. 715, 723 (1936).
204. Id. at 717.
205. Id. at 718.
206. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 § 2322 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-803 (Michie
2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-3 to -11 (1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.84.010-
11.84.900 (West 1998).
207. Twenty-five states had legislation by that year. Wade, supra note 203, at 715 n. 1 (citing
then current statutes).
208. See Kent S. Berk, Comment, Mercy Killing and the Slayer Rule: Should the
Legislatures Change Something?, 67 TUL. L. REV. 485, 493 (1992).
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B. Who's a Slayer?
The slayer rule codified by Professor Wade required that a killing be willful
and unlawful.2"9 However, as Professor Wade acknowledged "[t]he
requirement that the killing be wilful and unlawful cannot be said to be the
only possible rule; in fact, it 'is futile to attempt to arrive at a "true rule" by
pure logic.' But a line must be drawn at some place." 10 The majority of states
now define that line at "felonious and intentional" killing.21' That phrase,
employed by the UPC, 12 severely limits the breadth of a slayer statute to
murder and voluntary manslaughter, a view in accordance with Professor
Wade's beliefs.213 Only a small minority of states, including Oklahoma, draws
this line below voluntary manslaughter.
2 14
If one argues that the main purpose of a slayer statute is to deter, a slayer
statute should require premeditation and/or motivation of economic gain from
the killing. In that case, the law should restrict only premeditated killers from
taking from their victims, something which no slayer statute currently does.2 5
For example, it does not necessarily follow that a person's realization that he
will not inherit from his victim's estate will deter him from committing
voluntary manslaughter, a crime which is currently covered by the Oklahoma
statute.
To the extent that the slayer rule embraces other goals, most notably the
moral proposition that a person should not benefit from his own wrongful act,
then the rule should include crimes such as involuntary manslaughter.
However, following this reasoning, it is not a long leap to conclude that other
crimes, and even acts that are not crimes, should be worthy of conferring
slayer status. For example, South Dakota courts recently used a slayer statute
209. Wade, supra note 203, at 721-22.
210. Id. at 722 (quoting E. M. Grossman, Liability and Rights of the Insurer When the Death
of the Insured is Caused by the Beneficiary or an Assignee, 10 B.U. L. REv. 281, 290 (1930)).
211. The phrase, or a similar one is used in twenty-five states. See Sherman, supra note 4,
at 848 n.21 1, for a list of states and corresponding statutes.
212. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(b) (amended 1997).
213. Wade, supra note 203, at 721-22 (defining slayer as "any person who wilfully and
unlawfully takes or procures to be taken the life of another").
214. Sherman, supra note 4, at 848 n.213 ("The slayer statutes of Colorado, the District of
Columbia, Indiana, and Oklahoma refer specifically to 'manslaughter,' and the criminal statutes
of each of those jurisdictions characterize some unintentional homicides as manslaughter.").
215. States with stricter statutes may require a criminal conviction, but no state restricts the
rule to premeditated or malicious murder. Arkansas' very limited statute, applying to only





"to prevent beneficiaries who perpetrated fraud against the testator's estate
from collecting punitive damages which the estate received from them in a
prior suit." '216 The court was unable to apply the slayer statute because no
killing was involved.217 Instead, it accomplished the task by resorting to the
common law maxim that no person should be allowed to benefit from his
wrong.2 " However, in the context of applying a slayer statute, the better
formulation of that maxim is that no killer should be allowed to benefit from
his wrongful killing.219 This is the formulation used by the UPC slayer statute
in codifying the common law maxim.
220
However, that formulation does not dispose of the opposite proposition:
that an act less than intentional and felonious homicide should confer slayer
status when the result of the act is death. That is, why should a slayer statute
not apply in situations such as negligent homicide, involuntary manslaughter,
or even in cases of wrongful death liability? After all, in such cases, the ,killer
has engaged in wrongful conduct that resulted in death. Then why should the
killer benefit from his killing? The most logical answer exposes that the
purpose of a slayer statute is not only to punish a wrongdoer for bad behavior,
but also to deter killings motivated by potential economic benefit. However,
such reasoning does not explain the case where a killer in fact benefited
economically from the killing, but the benefit was not the motivating factor in
bringing out the death. Nevertheless, from the beginning, courts have ignored
the actual motivation of a killer when it was intentional.22' Perhaps the
reasoning is that requiring determination of actual motive would be too
difficult and costly, and not requiring such a determination does not impede
the deterrence purpose of the slayer rule. Thus, given these considerations,
the best rule is to allow any intentional and felonious homicide, including any
murder and voluntary manslaughter, to impart slayer status.222




219. See id. at 853.
220. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(f) (amended 1997) ("A wrongful acquisition of property
or interest by a killer not covered by this section must be treated in accordance with the
principle that a killer cannot profit from his [or her] wrong.").
221. See Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. App. Div. 1889) (holding that
"' [ilndependently of any proof of the motives"' a slayer will be prevented from benefiting from
the killing).
222. Underlying the above analysis lurks a more fundamental question: to what degree
should behavior and the death-time property transfer system be linked? See generally Frances
H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REv. 199 (2001); Underdahl,
supra note 3; Paula A. Monopoli, "Deadbeat Dads": Should Support and Inheritance Be
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C. The Requirement of a Conviction
223
1. The Necessity of a Conviction
Oklahoma courts are not alone in using their power of interpretation to
remove the conviction requirement from the slayer statute. Most other
jurisdictions have either removed or never had this requirement.224 In
balancing the respective positions, the majority's position is favorable. The
main reason given by other courts for removing the requirement of conviction
is the same as the reasoning of Oklahoma courts: the radical difference
between the burden of proof in criminal and civil courts. 225 As a general
proposition, it is well accepted that the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is bound to lead to more false acquittals than the requirement
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.2 26 But, the argument goes, it is
contrary to justice that a slayer should acquire property to which he would
have no right but for the "technical" acquittal.22 7
Another problem faced by authors of slayer statutes concerns protecting the
constitutional due process rights of potential plaintiffs. 2 8  For example,
suppose that X, a beneficiary under Y's will, kills Y. A criminal court acquits
X under an insanity theory. Z, the alternative beneficiary under Y's will, has
sufficient evidence to prove the crime by a preponderance of the evidence. In
a jurisdiction that views a criminal acquittal as a bar to further litigation, Z is
out of luck, even though she had no opportunity to offer evidence in the
criminal trial. The law has barred Z's rights in litigation in which she had no
opportunity to participate. Furthermore, even if Z did have such an
Linked?, 49 U. MiAMi L. REV. 257 (1994). To some extent the property transfer law seems to
be moving in that direction. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(c) (1990). That provision
insists that a parent, in order to be eligible to take from a deceased child, "openly treat[] the
child as his... and ... not refuse[] to support the child." Id.
223. See generally Sherman, supra note 4, at 848-56.
224. Id. at 855-56.
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) ("If, for example, the standard of
proof for a criminal trial were a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, there would be a smaller risk of factual errors that result in freeing guilty
persons, but a far greater risk of factual errors that result in convicting the innocent.").
227. Sherman, supra note 4, at 855-56.
228. See Mary Loise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter of Equity, 71 IOWA L.
REV. 489, 545 (1986) ("The slayer rule's most serious flaws are that the rule in some states is
overinclusive by denying the slayer the right to retain some property interests unrelated to the
victim's death and is underinclusive in some states by permitting the slayer to retain some




opportunity, her evidence would not necessarily be sufficient to prove the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt - otherwise there would be no acquittal.
By contrast, some commentators have asked whether Z's due process rights
are truly violated, in that she had no greater interest in Y's property than X,
that is, because no property was taken, but only an expectancy.229
Some commentators have strongly argued for removal of the conviction
requirement because of the high percentage of slayer cases in which the
slayer, soon after his crime, commits suicide. 3° In such a case, it is obviously
impossible to gain a criminal conviction of the slayer.23' Fundamental notions
of fairness and logic suggest that courts treat the homicide-suicide situation
identically to a case involving only homicide, at least in determining the status
of the slayer.
2. The Sufficiency of a Conviction
But what about the converse question? Should a civil court allow a slayer
who is convicted to relitigate his status in civil court? Traditionally, courts
have answered "yes," for some of the same concerns listed above - that the
party attempting to establish slayer status cannot invoke collateral estoppel for
judgments to which he was not a party.232 Some courts even ban the
conviction from coming into evidence under the theory that it is simply the
"opinion" of the jury.233
However, efficiency concerns weigh heavily in favor of allowing a
conviction to create slayer status per se, if it can be done without unduly
prejudicing the rights of any party involved."3 This risk can be avoided if the
statute creates a strong nexus between the elements of a particular crime and
the elements necessary to gain the status of slayer. For this reason, the statute
should clearly establish the elements necessary to create slayer status, or even
list some crimes for which a conviction creates an irrebuttable presumption of
slayer status.
229. Id. at 500; Sherman, supra note 4, at 856; Wade, supra note 203, at 723.
230. Wade, supra note 203, at 723.
231. Id.
232. Sherman, supra note 4, at 855.
233. Id. at 855-56.
234. See Fellows, supra note 228, at 499-500 ("The conviction requirement is seemingly
attractive because it eliminates the need for a court in a civil trial to inquire into the felonious
nature of a person's conduct."); Sherman, supra note 4, at 856 ("[Ilt is a great convenience to
be spared the trouble and expense of relitigating the question of the alleged slayer's guilt in the
civil proceeding....").
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This solution, however, creates potential problems in the area of assisted
suicide and similar cases.23 In such cases, defenses may be available in a civil
case that are not available in a criminal case.236 Thus, the best position might
be to compromise by allowing the evidence of a conviction to come in, but not
creating an irrebuttable presumption in any case.
D. What Does a Slayer Forfeit?
One of the most difficult issues confronting the drafter of a slayer statute
concerns exactly what the law should force a slayer to forfeit when a court
labels him a "slayer." Currently, Oklahoma's list is an ad hoc compilation,
created over many years without uniformity of drafting or thought. What is
needed is a statute that is not so broad as to risk infringing upon the rights that
a slayer retains, thereby risking constitutional violation, but not so narrow as
to allow a slayer to maintain control over the distribution of the victim's
estate.237
It is important to note that it is impossible to take away every benefit that
a person might gain from a felonious homicide. A person might kill for
emotional reasons, to silence another, or because he thinks it is the morally
correct action. It is impossible for the law to deprive a person of these types
of ephemeral gains from a wrongful act. The goal of slayer statutes, then,
must be more practical: to keep a wrongdoer from benefiting economically
from his wrongful act. This serves two broader purposes: (1) it lessens any
economic motivation that a killer might have to kill; and (2) it codifies the
moral proposition that no wrongdoer should benefit from his wrongful act.
These two propositions of keeping a slayer from economic benefit and yet
staying within the bounds of accepted and constitutional notions of property
rights should serve as guideposts to lawmakers, helping them determine which
rights a slayer should forfeit and which he should maintain. The simplest way
to serve both of these goals is to allow the statute to strip all expectancies
from the slayer, while allowing the slayer to maintain all actual property
rights he has already acquired. Note that the words vested and contingent are
not used because, although traditionally some vested rights are tantamount to
''mere expectancies," some contingent rights may be "actual" under this
system.
There are some rights that are expectancies upon which everyone can agree.
Rights gained under a will, through intestacy, and by contract all traditionally
235. Sherman, supra note 4, at 856.
236. Id.




fall into this category. Some rights are more difficult to categorize, such as
the right of survivorship in jointly owned personalty, powers of appointment,
irrevocable trusts, other will substitutes, vested remaindermen, and cases
where "a donor names the slayer as a default taker, subject to a power
exercisable by the victim."23 These are all examples of problem areas that a
slayer statute should specifically address.
Finally, the statute should cover special scenarios, such as what to do if the
slayer is pardoned or granted postconviction relief. These scenarios occur
only where a court has used evidence of conviction to establish slayer
status - for both problems could be avoided by insisting upon civil
adjudication to establish slayer status in every instance. However, as
suggested above, the best rule is to allow evidence of criminal guilt to
establish slayer status in some situations.239 Therefore, any statute should
consider solutions to these unique situations. In the case of a pardon, the court
should consider why the slayer was pardoned. If it is for a reason that in no
way exonerates the slayer from his crime, there is no reason to disturb the civil
judgment.
E. If Not the Slayer, Then Who?
Oklahoma courts have generally ignored the portion of the slayer statute
demanding that the benefits not going to the slayer should pass to the "other
heirs" of the victim.24 Presumably, they have done so because the law on its
face makes little sense and because a literal interpretation could seriously
frustrate the likely intent of the victim. In determining who should take,
legislatures are generally faced with the same types of policy goals that inform
an intestacy scheme: (1) a desire to effectuate the likely intent of the decedent,
and (2) a desire to mitigate the necessity of state intervention. However, these
two goals will not always suggest the same conclusion.
If the main purpose of a slayer statute is to effectuate the likely intent of the
decedent, the best approach may be to operate under the legal fiction that the
slayer predeceased the victim. In doing so, potential beneficiaries that the
decedent would most likely not have wanted to leave out (i.e., innocent issue
of the slayer) are not left out simply because they do not fit the technical
definition of "heir." This has been the almost-universal approach in America.
The UPC reaches a substantially similar result by treating slayers as if they
disclaimed their interest.24'
238. Id. at 510.
239. See supra Part IV.C.2.
240. See supra Part III.B.1.c.
241. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(e) (amended 1997). The reason the result is substantially
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One major problem with this approach occurs when the slayer-beneficiary
is not related to the victim-benefactor. In that case, or in states that do not
have adequate antilapse statutes, innocent issue of the slayer will be left with
nothing. However, there is a strong argument that if the victim had desired to
take care of those innocent issue, he would have done so more directly. Thus,
any effective slayer statute must work alongside a well-drafted antilapse
statute and intestate representational scheme if it is to most closely mirror the
probable intent of the victim.
F. Problems of Jurisprudence
Since the abolition of the feudal doctrines gave rise to the need for a slayer
rule, the question has arisen as to whose role it is to create that rule. Is it
solely within the province of the legislature, or is a judge free to adjust the
rule when faced with new facts and difficulties? Many great jurists have
posed and debated the question. 242 However, one novel solution avoids the
debate altogether. Somejurisdictions have written the common law maxim-
that a wrongdoer may not benefit from his wrong - into their codes. 243 This
solution provides judicial maneuvering, which is often necessary to impose
justice in these cases, and a firm statutory foundation.
One commentator argued that "the slayer rule is an essential element of the
property transfer law system and does not rest solely on equity principals." 2"
When the slayer rule is understood in this way, the controversy over the role
of the court as lawmaker is diffused. A court can establish the slayer rule
merely by performing its traditional function of statutory interpretation. 245
Such a concept is important to any effective slayer statute and should inform
Oklahoma's legislation as well.
V. Suggested Legislation
Because the UPC slayer statute solves most of the problems discussed in
the previous section, and in the interest of uniformity, this comment suggests
that Oklahoma adopt the UPC model slayer statute with some minor changes.
The following is the UPC slayer statute in pertinent part, broken down into the
similar is that a disclaimant under the UPC is generally treated as if he predeceased the
decedent. Id. § 2-801(d).
242. See generally Farber, supra note 27. Professor Farber points out: "Among others,
Riggs attracted the attention of Pound, Cardozo, Hart and Sacks, Dworkin, and Posner." Id. at
31 (footnotes omitted).
243. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(0 (amended 1997).
244. Fellows, supra note 228, at 490.




categories used throughout this comment: (1) how a court determines slayer
status, (2) what rights a slayer forfeits, and (3) how a court should distribute
the bounty. Other pertinent sections are also included.24
6
A. Who Is a Slayer?
(g) After all right to appeal has been exhausted, a judgment of
conviction establishing criminal accountability for the felonious
and intentional killing of the decedent conclusively establishes the
convicted individual as the decedent's killer for purposes of this
section. In the absence of a conviction, the court, upon the petition
of an interested person, must determine whether, under a clear and
convincing evidence [the preponderance of evidence] standard, the
individual would be found criminally accountable for the felonious
and intentional killing of the decedent. If the court determines
that, under that standard, the individual would be found criminally
accountable for the felonious and intentional killing of the
decedent, the determination conclusively establishes that
individual as the decedent's killer for purposes of this section.
247
The most significant suggested change to the UPC slayer statue in this
section is that a court must find civil proof of a killing by a clear and
convincing evidence standard, as opposed to a preponderance test, which is
the rule in most jurisdictions.248 The change accords with noted scholars who
persuasively argue that "[tihe higher burden of proof seems appropriate given
the stigma of a finding that a person feloniously and intentionally killed the
decedent." '249 One state, Maine, enacted this change when adopting the UPC
slayer statute,25° and another, Wisconsin, has made the change judicially.
2"'
This section also solves the problem of postconviction relief by not
allowing a judgment of criminal conviction to establish status until after all
rights of appeal are exhausted. Further, by allowing the matter to be litigated
civilly, the issue of executive pardon is removed: once a civil court determines
slayer status, a criminal pardon would be irrelevant.
246. The following sections generally follow the UPC slayer statute. UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 2-803 (amended 1997). Unmodified text is in italics and includes section numbering; my
changes are normal typeface, and my deletions are bracketed.
247. See id. § 2-803(g).
248. Fellows, supra note 228, at 502.
249. Id.
250. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-803 (West 1998).
251. In re Estate of Safran, 306 N.W.2d 27, 36 (Wis. 1981).
2004]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2004
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
B. What Rights Does a Slayer Forfeit and Where Do They Go?
(b) An individual who feloniously and intentionally kills the
decedent forfeits all benefits under this Article with respect to the
decedent' s estate, including an intestate share, an elective share,
an omitted spouse's or child's share, a homestead allowance,
exempt property, and a family allowance. If the decedent died
intestate, the decedent's intestate estate passes as if the killer
disclaimed his [or her] intestate share.
(c) The felonious and intentional killing of the decedent:
(1) revokes any revocable (i) disposition or appointment of
property made by the decedent to the killer in a governing
instrument, (ii) provision in a governing instrument conferring a
general or nongeneral power of appointment on the killer, and (iii)
nomination of the killer in a governing instrument, nominating or
appointing the killer to serve in any fiduciary or representative
capacity, including a personal representative, executor, trustee, or
agent; and
(2) severs the interests of the decedent and killer in property
held by them at the time of the killing as joint tenants with the right
of survivorship [or as community property with the right of
survivorship], transforming the interests of the decedent and killer
into tenancies in common.252
This provision is well-drafted because it includes all the possible
expectancies that a slayer might hope to gain by committing homicide, and it
addresses both testate and intestate succession.
The above sections, however, must be read with the following definitions
in mind.
(a) In this section:
(1) "Disposition or appointment of property" includes a
transfer of an item ofproperty or any other benefit to a beneficiary
designated in a governing instrument.
(2) "Governing instrument" means a governing instrument
executed by the decedent.
(3) "Revocable," with respect to a disposition, appointment,
provision, or nomination, means one under which the decedent, at
the time of or immediately before death, was alone empowered, by




law or under the governing instrument, to cancel the designation,
in favor of the killer, whether or not the decedent was then
empowered to designate himself [or herself] in place of his [or
her] killer and or the decedent then had capacity to exercise the
power.
253
There is no need to change this definitional section.
C. Other Issues
The UPC also contains sections that thoroughly deal with the rights of
innocent third parties, bona fide purchasers for value, and federal preemption:
(h) Protection of Payors and Other Third Parties.
(1) A payor or other third party is not liable for having made a
payment or transferred an item of property or any other benefit to
a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument affected by an
intentional and felonious killing, or for having taken any other
action in good faith reliance on the validity of the governing
instrument, upon request and satisfactory proof of the decedent's
death, before the payor or other third party received written notice
of a claimed forfeiture or revocation under this section. A payor
or other third party is liable for a payment made or other action
taken after the payor or other third party received written notice
of a claimed forfeiture or revocation under this section.
(2) Written notice of a claimed forfeiture or revocation under
paragraph (1) must be mailed to the payor's or other third party's
main office or home by registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested, or served upon the payor or other third party in the
same manner as a summons in a civil action. Upon receipt of
written notice of a claimed forfeiture or revocation under this
section, a payor or other third party may pay any amount owed or
transfer or deposit any item of property held by it to or with the
court having jurisdiction oftheprobateproceedings relating to the
decedent's estate, or if no proceedings have been commenced, to
or with the court having jurisdiction of probate proceedings
relating to decedents' estates located in the county of the
decedent's residence. The court shall hold the funds or item of
property and, upon its determination under this section, shall
order disbursement in accordance with the determination.
253. Id. § 2-803(a).
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Payments, transfers, or deposits made to or with the court
discharge the payor or other third party from all claims for the
value of amounts paid to or items of property transferred to or
deposited with the court.
(i) Protection of Bona Fide Purchasers; Personal Liability of
Recipient.
(1) A person who purchases property for value and without
notice, or who receives a payment or other item of property in
partial or full satisfaction of a legally enforceable obligation, is
neither obligated under this section to return the payment, item of
property, or benefit nor is liable under this section for the amount
of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit. But
a person who, not for value, receives a payment, item ofproperty,
or any other benefit to which the person is not entitled under this
section is obligated to return the payment, item of property, or
benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the payment or the
value of the item of property or benefit, to the person who is
entitled to it under this section.
(2) If this section or any part of this section is preempted by
federal law with respect to a payment, an item of property, or any
other benefit covered by this section, a person who, not for value,
receives the payment, item of property, or any other benefit to
which the person is not entitled under this section is obligated to
return the payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally
liable for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of
property or benefit, to the person who would have been entitled to
it were this section or part of this section not preempted. 254
Finally, the UPC includes a "catchall" provision, which would allow courts
to solve any apparent injustices that might arise under new facts with a firm
statutory basis. It provides:
(t9 A wrongful acquisition of property or interest by a killer not
covered by this section must be treated in accordance with the
principle that a killer cannot profit from his [or her] wrong. 255
Although this type of caveat would certainly appeal to judges who are
trying to decide real cases, critics might argue that it removes the incentive for
legislatures to devise innovative and comprehensive legislation. As discussed
254. Id. § 2-803 (h-i).








The Oklahoma statute concerning the slayer and his bounty is currently
riddled with problems. Although creative judicial interpretation has
ameliorated concern in some areas, in others, such interpretation has
exacerbated the statute's ambiguities. The best solution is to repeal the old
law and enact new legislation that covers as many situations as possible. In
addition, such legislation should codify the principle that the law cannot allow
a culpable killer to benefit from his killing. This would put future cases of
necessary judicial stretching on firmer footing and foster the greatest possible
balance of justice.
Gregory C. Blackwell
256. See supra Part N.E.
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